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This thesis has been realized within the agribusiness sector and 
experiments the Transaction Cost Theory a branch of the New 
Institutional Economy which explain market failure caused by 
many factors. Transaction costs are associated with carrying a 
transaction between buyers and sellers. This study has been 
conducted between 2014 and 2017; and has collected data from 
11 broiler producers in Jezzine, Lebanon, about: production 
costs, capital investment, revenues, land tenure, access to 
infrastructure, and information about the contract. The 
propensity score matching method is used to compare the effect 
of participating in contract farming and to solve the hypotheses, 
which say: There is a positive relationship between contract 
farming and the economic benefits of broiler producers and the 
development of the broiler sector in Jezzine District. Findings 
from farmer’s interviews indicated that sustainability, 
guaranteed price, risk reduction, credit facilities and technical 
aids are the main reasons for signing a contract. In contrast, 
Farmers have expressed problems concerning the contractors’ 
responsibilities such as delay in payment and delivery. Also, 
when prices are high, it was argued that farmers were selling the 
products in the open market. 
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Introduction 
 
In the Global Value Chain, agriculture must be able to meet the rapidly 
growing demand for food, and a global strategy is needed to ensure a sustainable 
food production system, to face the challenge of feeding 9 billion people in 2050, 
and to ensure that every human being has access to adequate food (Godfray, 
Beddington, Crute, haddad, Lawrence, Muir & Toulmin, 2010). Agricultural 
value chains are undergoing rapid transformation changes because of 
urbanization, industrialization, globalization, and trade liberalization (Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Swinnen, 2007; Reardon, Barrett, 
Berdegue & Swinnen, 2009); also because of capital mobility, income growth, 
technology, innovation, product differentiation, changes in consumer preferences, 
diet westernization, shifting consumption toward processed foods, and improved 
communications which are linking small farmers with consumers worldwide 
(Pingali, 2007); besides the spreading of supermarkets and fast-food restaurants, 
and the growing importance of quality standards (Reardon & Berdegue, 2002; 
Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003; Shepherd, 2005). Supermarkets procurement 
system favors centralized purchasing, specialized wholesalers, and certified 
suppliers (Neven & Reardon, 2004; Berdegue, Balsevish, Flores & Reardon, 2005); 
these characteristics require more vertical integration, thus favoring the 
introduction of contract farming (Key & Runsten, 1999; Bijman, 2008). Spurred 
by those changes, agricultural systems are being forced to adapt and modernize, 
they have been restructured, becoming increasingly market-oriented and 
consumer-driven, also new ways of organizing the agri-food sector are being 
promoted; and different forms of vertical integration are being introduced (Elms 
& Low, 2013). In these modern systems, the traditional spot market mechanism 
in which food is produced, without farmers having a clear idea in advance; to 
whom, when and at what price they are going to sell their crops, is being replaced 
by alternative forms of vertical integration, strategic alliances, or full ownership, 
also it has provided the drive for further development and a rapid expansion of 
contract farming, which has been studied extensively for decades, and has become 
an essential element of modern agricultural value chains (Shepherd, 2007). 
 
 
Literature review 
 
Current literature for contract studies mainly focuses on incentives and risk 
shares. Some authors of case studies of broiler contracts between farmers and 
processors have argued that risk reduction is a major incentive for contracting 
and contract-farming reduces transaction costs and can make smallholders 
overcome existing market imperfections; Contract farming is an institutional 
solution to the problems of market failure (Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). 
It is generally considered that contract farming ensures consistent procurement 
and therefore helps processing companies to optimize their processing capacity 
and their fixed assets investment with regard to spot markets; discontinuity risks 
while avoiding integrated production risks (Eaton et Shepherd, 2001; Johnson and 
Foster, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). Contracting is common for industrial 
crops (e.g. sugarcane, tobacco, tea, broiler, dairy, and horticulture) particularly 
when destined for high-income consumers willing to pay a premium for quality 
and food safety (Minot 1986). The origin of the contracting is so different. 
Development of agriculture from a traditional structure to a market oriented 
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structure is the major challenge for developing, less developed countries and 
economies in transition. For these countries, it is generally agreed that food 
processing is a key industry which should receive high priority both at national 
and international levels. The food-processing industry is important for economic 
growth and health of people. Development of food industry promotes 
development in other sectors through forward and backward linkages. Developing 
countries need to develop their food resources more extensively not only to 
provide new job opportunities and increase national income via accruing value 
and exports, but also to supply safe and adequate processed food to consumers. In 
a globalized world, there is a close relationship between the changes in 
agricultural and food markets of developed countries and developments in 
developing and less developed countries through international funds and donors, 
foreign direct investments and activities of multinational companies. The wave of 
privatization and liberalization of the developed world have helped in bringing 
about a new form of vertical coordination between private companies and farmers 
in countries which are so called countries in transition. Recent developments in 
peri-urban areas of West Africa such as structural reforms, encouragement of 
subsistence farming to grow high-value crops, enhancing private sector have 
created remarkable changes in production and marketing organization using in 
many cases contract farming. It has been observed that there is an increased 
importance in close vertical coordination in the countries in transition. 
 
 
Theoretical foundations 
 
The starting point for this perspective is Coase’s in 1937 with a simple 
question: why do firms exist? (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) Coase’s answer is: 
to minimize the transaction costs of exchange (Coase & Piaget, 1661; Schlag, 
1989; Coase, 2012). Thus, if it is cheaper for a firm to produce an input, 
compared to purchasing it, in an uncertain and unreliable market, then it will 
integrate backwards to do so (Stuckey & White, 1993). 
All markets require some form of vertical coordination between participants, 
such as farmers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers (Minot, 2011). Often 
transaction without any contract is called: spot market or open market that 
involves no written or oral commitments, it provides freedom but uncertainties 
for buyers and sellers (Rehber, 1998, 2000). In general spot markets show 
deficiencies; in overcoming problems resulting from imperfect markets, and in 
transferring information regarding quality, timing and future demand. One way of 
vertical integration in agriculture is contract farming; it is an intermediate form 
of industrial organization standing between spot markets and full vertical 
integration (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). It is evolved in order to overcome 
constraints of market failures, and missing markets: observed in terms of natural 
vagaries and price fluctuations, to ensure market participation of smallholder and 
marginal farmers (Barrett, 2008). 
 
 
Foundation in transaction cost theory 
 
The major theoretical background for contract farming is based on the 
Transaction Cost Theory, which is a branch of New Institutional Economics, 
which provides a useful explanation of many problems of market failure and 
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missing markets caused by asymmetric information and a range of other factors 
(Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002). 
According to the New Institutional Economics, all market transactions 
between economic actors are hazardous, involve costs, and can entail considerable 
losses; institutions have been created to reduce the costs of resource allocation 
and uncertainty level (Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs are defined as the 
costs associated with carrying out a transaction between buyers and sellers, 
including: finding a buyer, reaching, negotiating, delivering the commodity, 
obtaining payment, enforcing agreements as well as the risks associated with the 
transaction (Coase, 1960; Allen, 1999; MacDonald, Perry, Ahearn, Banker, 
Chambers, Dimitri & Southard, 2004; Minot, 2011). Because contracting involves 
costs, it is economically justifiable only: when the buyer is a large firm; when the 
product is characterized by large quality variations, perishability, technically 
difficult production, and high value product; when the policy environment is 
conducive, and the destination market is willing to pay a premium for certain 
product attributes (Minot, 2007, 2011). Transaction costs in agriculture sector are 
high in many developing countries; they contribute to market failures and 
imperfect markets (Pingali, Khwaja & Meijer, 2005). Different governance 
structures and contracting forms arise and the most suitable depends on the costs 
and the characteristics of a transaction (Williamson, 1981). 
 
 
Factors for the emergence of contract farming 
 
We consider many factors for the emergence and evolution of contract 
farming: bounded rationality, opportunistic behavior, asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency of transactions; in the absence of these factors, spot 
market trading is most efficient, and contract farming would not occur since 
agribusiness firms could buy all their produce from the spot market which would 
be instantly and perfectly responsive to their demand (Williamson, 1979; 
Simmons, 2002). However, in reality one or more of these problems may happen 
which indicates the need for contract farming. Another procurement option for 
agribusiness firms is to operate their own plantations; yet, with this option they 
may face other transaction costs such as supervision costs, costs of land and skill 
acquisition, and crop risk. Therefore, contract farming may occur only if it 
generates lower transaction costs compared to the other alternatives of market 
arrangement (Hobbs, 1996; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Simmons, 2002). Among the 
many aspects in current analyses are organizational arrangements like: 
Bounded Rationality: Contracted parties suffer from information deficiencies 
and are unable to process all the information available to them to formulate 
solution and solve complex problems in a costless and straightforward way 
(Simmons, Winters & Patrick, 2005; Bijman, 2008); 
Opportunistic Behavior: The probability that the other party will engage in 
opportunistic behavior is hard and costly to predict. Actors seek self-interest 
without considering the other party; they can deceive, lie, cheat and steal 
(Bijman, 2008); 
Asset Specificity: An investment made by farmer or buyer which is dedicated 
to a certain transaction has little or no value in alternative use which leads to 
asset specificity and may result in hold-up problems. Thus, commodities with a 
higher degree of asset specificity require an involvement in vertical coordination 
in order to reduce risks, and to protect those assets (Gow & Swinnen, 1998; 
Martinez, 1999; Bijman, 2008); 
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Level of Uncertainty: Lack of information about market conditions for 
farmers, and about the quality of product for buyers is a challenge in carrying out 
profitable transactions. The main source of uncertainty is incomplete and 
asymmetric information on current and future conditions (Bijman, 2008; Prowse, 
2012); 
Frequency of Transactions: A repeated interaction between trading partners 
to maintain a reputation for fair dealing and to mitigate opportunism, even in the 
absence of contracts or vertical integration (Klein, 2006). 
 
 
Hypotheses development 
 
It is clear that there are some controversies and gaps in the existing literature 
about the impacts of contract farming on broiler producers, certain areas have 
been widely addressed by researchers, while other areas such as long-term 
profitability have been less explored. The contract system has advantages and 
disadvantages, one of the key advantages for producers, is the shift of production 
and market risk to the integrator. Similarly, contracts that broiler companies 
have with family farmers have allowed thousands of people to get into farming, 
diversify and expand their farming operation, and more securely lock in a stable 
income flow. Thus the hypothesis we have formulated likely mirrors the situation. 
- There is a positive relationship between contract farming and the economic 
benefits of broiler producers and their sustainability. 
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Figure 1: Contract Farming Conceptual Framework 
Source: based on Eaton, C.S., 1998b: 274 
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Figure 2: Contract Farming Theoretical Framework; Majid, R., & Hassan, S. (2014). Performance of broiler contract 
farmers: A case study in Perak, Malaysia. UMK Procedia, 1, 18-25. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Agricultural contracting has been identified as urgently needing further 
research, in order to explore the topic in depth; we compiled a literature review 
of existing contract farming studies, the methodology that we will use is by 
observing outcomes across different farmers implementing contract farming in a 
given time period in different areas. This kind of methodology reflects the 
majority of the existing literature around contract farming. It is a questionnaire 
data; the data will allow us to better understand the variations in the industry. 
In our study, we will complete a comparative analysis between contract and non-
contract broiler producers in Jezzine District, Lebanon. We will collect data from 
a sample of eleven broiler producers from different village based on a 
questionnaire, the sample of those farmers we choose is based on those 11 
respondent criteria: 
-Geographical location which is Jezzine District. 
-The education level varies between one farmer and the other from school 
to university degree. 
-The age of the farmers range from 30 to 65. 
An underlying goal of our study is to explore the acknowledged gaps in the 
existing literature related to Lebanon and in particular for Jezzine District, and 
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to better understand the full scope of impacts of contract farming on broiler 
producers. 
This dissertation contains the results of a Two-year research. We used a 
convenience sampling method, quantitative approach using an experimentation 
by selection of 11 farmers on a convenient sampling method because of limited 
number of farmers in Jezzine area and because they are dispersed in this 
geographical location and it is hard to reach them all. A sample of 11 broiler 
producers was randomly chosen. The aim is to obtain information on production, 
costs and production efficiency. We did a direct interview using a survey at the 
farmer level were conducted to understand and to investigate. The entire research 
was conducted during the period between Sep 2014 and September 2017. 
Previous research indicated a wide diversity of results, from cases in which 
farmers have benefited substantially in terms of income and improved farming 
skills to those in which growers appear to have been severely exploited by firms. 
The data collected from the questionnaires includes: Growing patterns, capital 
equipment, basic producer’s data, income and changes, changes in growing 
patterns and labor used, and differences between contract and non-contract 
farmers. Qualitative and quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of contract 
farming relied on the analysis of the data collected. To assess the impact of 
contract farming participation on income, the propensity score matching method 
was applied. It is a treatment effect correction model used to reduce bias when 
estimating the effect of treatments. As a non-experimental approach, propensity 
score matching has been applied in many previous researches about contract 
farming; because it formulates comparison of treatment groups. In the studies of 
contract farming there are two other commonly used correction models for cross-
sectional data: Instrument Variable Method and Heckman Selection Correction 
Model. The disadvantages of applying these models to this study are, that first 
there is no suitable variable associated with contract participation that is 
independent of income estimation for instrument variable approach; second, the 
Heckman’s correction model assumes strict condition of distribution function of 
joint error term associated with participation and income equation, which does 
not fit with our data. Propensity score matching does not require any functional 
form assumption for matching and thus can obtain more robust estimation than 
imposing regression model with the risk of inaccurate distributional assumption. 
Because of these assumptions of our data, propensity score matching was more 
applicable than any other approach for estimating the impact of contract 
participation on income. Matching estimation is a widely used method to 
compare the treatment effect of participating in some programs. Basically, it 
compares the outcome of the program participants with the outcome of 
nonparticipants. We first assume that there are two potential outcomes: The 
outcome of the person participating in the program and the outcome of the 
person not participating in the program. A person can only either participate or 
not participate the program, and therefore there will be only one outcome 
observed. 
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Results 
 
To analyze the impact of contract farming on the income of broiler producers, 
primary data was collected using questionnaires in Jezzine District. Farmers were 
placed into various number of both contract and non-contract broiler producers. 
The survey was conducted on May 2017. However, the data on production was 
for all the period of farmer’s production. Information collected included welfare 
characteristics of producers, land, asset endowments, access to infrastructure 
(roads, electricity, water, and telephone), information on revenue earned, cost 
incurred in broiler production, transaction costs, information about producer’s 
income and information about the nature of the contract. 
 
Table 1: Data about the surveyed broiler producers in Jezzine district 
Name Location Years of 
Experience 
Number of 
Broilers 
Land Area 
M2 
Contract 
Farming 
Joe Kozhaya Wadi laymoun 3 12000 50000 Yes 
Elias Al 
Asmar 
Jezzine 7 15000 10000 No 
Tony 
Jadoun 
Zhalta 3 2500 8000 No 
Chdid Chdid Snaya 7 6000 6000 No 
Simone 
Chdid 
Snaya 7 11000 8000 No 
Salim Nassif Haytoura 5 6000 1000 No 
Pierre Antar Zhalta 1 10000 2000 No 
Maroun Bou 
Rached 
Jezzine 1 7000 30000 Yes 
Joseph Abou 
Zeid 
Sfaray 4 30000 3500 No 
Douale 
Zaelit 
Baba Azour 17 18000 20000 No 
Charbel 
Hneine 
Wadi Jezzine  6 10000 2000 No 
 
In the study region, interviews have been carried out with 3 contracted and 8 
farmers who do not have contractual relations. Contract farming was widely used 
in the production of broiler. Two third of the farmers, who were interviewed, 
indicated that sustainability, guaranteed price, risk reduction, credit facilities and 
technical aids are the main reasons for signing a contract. Producers generally 
interpret they are not interested in what is written on the contract. However, half 
of the producers who replied to questions about contract provisions said they did 
not read the contract beforehand and merely signed it. Producers who read the 
contract indicated they could not understand most of the language used. Farmers 
have expressed some problems concerning the contractors’ responsibilities such as 
delay in payment, delivery, inadequate technical input aids, and information, and 
that processors would like to spread delivery over a long period. In the study 
region, 8 farmers, who are not involved in a contractual relationship, were 
interviewed. Two third of interviewed farmers indicated they were familiar with 
contract farming and had contracts previously. Farmers will not enter into 
contract farming unless they believe there will be benefits. The contracts resulted 
in improved returns to capital. From the average returns of contract and non-
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contract farmers the contract enables farmers to generate a positive effect on 
income for farmers. The main reason for the difference is because of contract 
growers had lower production and transaction costs. For contact producers, the 
processor advances most of the inputs. Compared to the non contract producers, 
the contract grower needs less working capital and therefore incurs lower costs. 
 
Table 2: Result indicated by farmers and score matched on propensity method 
  Broiler producers   
Hypothesis 
Contracted 
Producers Non-Contracted Producers Variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
    
H1a: Income of 
farmers 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
  
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 Technical Support 
    
  
H1b: Poultry 
industry in 
Jezzine  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
  1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 Delay in payment 
 
 
In contrast, the frequent failure of contract farming was also an important 
finding in the study. Disputes related to price and methods of payment were 
primary reasons for not continuing with contracts. As observed in broiler 
production, these dissatisfactions along with the availability of other marketing 
alternatives have caused an attitude against contract farming. However, even the 
contracted farmers had a tendency for using other alternatives to decrease market 
risk. Processors prepare contracts which mean that they determine the conditions 
of the contracts. However, most of the interviewed farmers have agreed that all 
contract provisions could not be realized. When the spot market prices are higher 
than the prices placed in contract, it was argued that farmers were selling the 
products in open market, which have been produced under contract. Factors 
influencing farmers’ participation in contract farming, among all are: Distance to 
the main road, education, size of farm significantly influenced the probability of 
participation in broiler contract farming. Results also indicated that distance to 
the main road negatively influenced farmers’ participation. This implies that the 
further away the farm is from the main road, the less likely the farmer will 
participate in contract production. This finding is perhaps due to the fact that 
the contracting firm prefers to work with farmers who are near the main roads 
due to ease of reaching such farms. The level of education of the farmer, however, 
has a negative effect on the farmer’s likelihood to participate in contract farming. 
Results show that an increase in years of education will reduce the likelihood to 
participate in contract farming, other things. This is probably due to the fact 
that more educated farmers are more likely to seek information on other 
marketing channels in the region including hotels and rural assemblers. Education 
level has a positive significant effect on contract farming, which means the 
operator with higher education level is more likely to use contract farming. Farm 
size has a positive significant effect on contract farming, which means if the size 
of the farm is larger; it is more likely to use contract farming. Hence, it can be 
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assumed that the contract provides more precise and experienced extension 
service or technical advice than the non-contracted farmers. It also highlights 
that government can play a crucial role in linking broiler producer to market, 
particularly in developing countries. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The above discussion reveals that because of poor performances of 
institutions, broiler industry is facing major crisis such as, decelerating growth, 
increasing numbers of farmer suicides, and widening disparities in farm incomes. 
Suicide is confined to certain regions and certain group of farmers who produce 
for market. To overcome these problems successive central and various state 
governments have been undertaking an array of policy measures. Among those 
measures, promotion of private sector participation in contract farming is an 
important one. In response to this contract farming has emerged as a new 
institutional arrangement encompassing broiler industry to bring down the 
market uncertainties and complexity of the problem. On the other hand, spot 
market cannot fulfill the firm’s demand. By entering into contract, farmers can 
access the better quality of inputs and extension services along with credit from 
sponsors. Contract farming stimulates technology and skill transfer and supports 
to farmers in meeting of international standard. Contract farming boosts farm 
income by opening up opportunities and employing resources in an efficient 
manner. 
It is clear from that contract farming is not suited to all commodities or 
economic conditions. Studies emphasize that the appropriateness of contract 
farming as a rural development strategy can change between a district and 
another, a governorate and another, a country and another. In Lebanon 
competitive markets, income diversification and booming imports opportunities 
have rendered contract farming sometimes ineffective and largely unnecessary. In 
some regions in Lebanon, the second generation of broiler producers have little 
interest in continuing to produce broiler in small or large scale, instead they 
prefer and can frequently obtain urban or city employment in manufacturing, 
services or other sectors. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through this research and the analysis of the existing literature, several 
important insights have been made clear. Contract farming is largely successful in 
improving farmer economic welfare. From a developmental perspective, this bears 
important implications because policymakers can be reasonably assured that 
investment of resources into developing contract farming is a fruitful policy 
venture. This dissertation shows that there is increase in income in contract 
production; it revealed that contract farming leads to greater production 
compared to non-contract farming. This indicates that the provision of extension 
service or technical advice by an enterprise might improve the production since 
enterprise has more experience in broiler production than farmers. We found that 
education positively effect on contract participation. The result revealed that 
farmers producing under a contract had significantly higher incomes than non-
contract households, and producers transfer most of their production risk to 
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processors. Entering a contract farming arrangement means gaining access to 
credit, inputs, and technical assistance. Throughout this study, we find that 
public enterprises play a crucial role in promoting contract farming development 
in Lebanon, particularly in an economy ridden with market failures and 
imperfections. Further institutional improvements are necessary to facilitate 
efficient resource allocation for further development of the Lebanese broiler 
sector. Along with institutional improvements such as pricing, contract 
enforcement, and providing more information on contract farming to small-scale 
broiler growers. 
This study examined and evaluated the impact of contract farming on the 
economic sustainability of smallholders in broiler production in Jezzine District, 
Lebanon. Comparison was made between two groups of farmers namely 
independent farmers and contracted farmers. A sample of 11 farmers were 
selected and interviewed using questionnaires and the data is analyzed. Results of 
impact assessment show that participating in contract farming has a positive and 
significant effect on the economic welfare of broiler producers and can reduce 
rural poverty as some policies which will make it easier for farmers to participate 
in contract farming should be pursued. Contract farming has been proposed as an 
avenue for private sector to take over the roles previously served by the 
government in the provision of information, inputs or credit for farmers in 
developing countries. 
After literature review, the paper set up the overall hypothesis that assumes a 
positive relationship between contract farming and economic benefits and 
sustainability of small-scale farmers. This study applied deeply case study 
approach with one case investigated in Jezzine District - Lebanon. By analyzing 
and discussing the results following the methodology used it is concluded that the 
hypothesis is supported by several factors. 
The experience of broiler production is increasing, and it has contrasted with 
products imported from developed countries through global meat trade. Broiler 
producers face constraints that limit their potential to increase productivity and 
income. Access to credit is limited by the high interest rates demanded. There 
are also a number of disadvantages and threats, such as the limits to the 
inclusivity of contract farming schemes, which is often restricted to the top tier of 
smallholder producers; nonetheless, it is possible that the farmers can lock into a 
situation of increasing debt because they cannot move out from contract easily 
after entering into it. Usually, firm supplies inputs and sometimes machinery to 
growers in advance and takes it back payment through the deduction from crop 
income. This induces farmers to keep contracting with the firm year after year 
just to pay off these loans. The development of these phenomena are often 
generate problems for farmers who have limited business experience. Contracting 
has certain harmful consequences, as well it creates tension between contracting 
parties; often unequal relations between larger integrators and farmers, farmers 
bearing high risks, and contract terms for farmers declining over time in the 
process of ‘agribusiness normalization’. The firms also tend to practice 
“agribusiness normalization” over time which means that they reduce the prices 
and other benefits offered to the growers with which they commence operations, 
when the procurement base is created and there are enough farmers to procure 
from. 
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